Selon l'hypothèse de Porter, des réglementations environnementales (RE) strictes doivent avoir un impact positif sur la productivité des firmes touchées. Dans ce papier, nous revoyons les arguments théoriques et empiriques entourant cette hypothèse. Nous montrons qu'il existe peu de justifications théoriques solides à cette hypothèse mais que des développements théoriques récents (comme par exemple la théorie de la firme) offrent des perspectives intéressantes. Sur le plan empirique, la plupart des évidences suggèrent que, globalement, les RE ont un impact plutôt négatif sur les entreprises qui y sont soumises. Toutefois, ces recherches présentent de nombreuses limites et notamment une absence de cadre théorique. De plus, les mesures de productivité utilisées sont généralement inadéquates puisqu'elles ne tiennent pas compte explicitement de l'existence d'outputs indésirables. Nous revoyons les travaux récents sur les mesures de productivité verte. De notre revue de la littérature, nous concluons que si l'on doit rester sceptique vis-à-vis de cette hypothèse, il est encore prématuré pour la rejeter complètement.
The Porter hypothesis predicts that environmental regulations (ER) should have a positive impact on the productivity of the regulated firms. In this paper, we review the theoretical and empirical arguments surrounding this hypothesis. We show that there are relatively few formal theoretical justifications to this hypothesis. However, some recent theoretical advances (particularly in firm theory) provide intriguing possibilities. Generally, empirical evidence suggest that ER have a negative impact on regulated firms. However, these studies have numerous limitations and particularly a lack of theoretical framework. Moreover, the measures of productivity used are generally inadequate since they do not explicitly include undesirable outputs. We discuss the recent development of green productivity measures. From this review of the literature, we conclude that while there are evidence against the Porter Hypothesis, it is probably too soon to completely reject it.
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Paper provided by Université Laval - Département d'économique in its series Cahiers de recherche with number
0107.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Capital and Total Factor Productivity; Capacity Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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