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Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion

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  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Thomas, Alban
  • Zaporozhets, Vera

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub- sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.

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File URL: http://www2.toulouse.inra.fr/lerna/travaux/cahiers2012/12.12.369.pdf
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Paper provided by LERNA, University of Toulouse in its series LERNA Working Papers with number 12.12.369.

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Date of creation: 18 Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ler:wpaper:26048

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  8. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2009. "Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 851-868, March.
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  12. Andrew McLennan & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining," Economics Working Paper Archive 562, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  13. Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Michel Le Breton & Maria Montero & Vera Zaporozhets, 2011. "Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics," Discussion Papers 2011-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  15. Thomas Alban, 1995. "Regulating Pollution under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Industrial Wastewater Treatment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 357-373, May.
  16. Hülya K. K. Eraslan, 2008. "Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates From A Bargaining Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 659-681, 05.
  17. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
  18. Klevorick, Alvin K. & Kramer, Gerald H., 1973. "Social choice on pollution management: the genossenschaften," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 101-146, April.
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  21. Brian Knight, 2005. "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1639-1652, December.
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