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On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria

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  • Rabia Nessah

    ()
    (IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS))

  • Guoqiang Tian

    (Texas A&M University, USA)

Abstract

This paper investigates the existence of strong Nashequilibria (SNE) in continuous and convex games. We show that the concavity and an additional condition on payoff functions, together with the compactness of strategy space, permit the existence of strong Nash equilibria. These conditions are satisfied in many economic games and are quite simple to check. We also characterize the existence of SNE by providing a necessary and sufficient condition. Moreover, we suggest a procedure that can be used to efficiently compute strong Nash equilibrium. The result is illustrated with an application to an economy with multilateral environmental externalities and to the simple oligopoly static model.

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File URL: http://my.ieseg.fr/bienvenue/DownloadDoc.asp?Fich=44045475_2009-ECO-06_Nessah_Tian.pdf
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File URL: http://my.ieseg.fr/bienvenue/DownloadDoc.asp?Fich=230987888_2010-ECO-12_Nessah_Tian.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IESEG School of Management in its series Working Papers with number 2009-ECO-06.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ies:wpaper:e200906

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Related research

Keywords: Non cooperative game; strong Nash equilibrium; weak Pareto-efficiency;

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References

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  1. Slikker, M. & Nouweland, C.G.A.M. van den, 1997. "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division," Discussion Paper 1997-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Voorneveld, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Megen, F.J.C. van & Tijs, S.H. & Facchini, G., 1999. "Congestion games and potentials reconsidered," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-169686, Tilburg University.
  3. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
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