Natural and Double Implementation of Public Ownership Solutions in Differentiable Production Economies
AbstractThis paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the proportional and equal benefit solutions respectively in Nash and strong Nash equilibria are proposed without assuming free disposal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0404r.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
GAMES ; GAME THEORY ; GOVERNMENT POLICY ; OWNERSHIP;
Other versions of this item:
- Naoki Yoshihara, 1999. "Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 127-151.
- Yoshihara, N., 1996. "Natural and Double Implementation of Public Ownership Solutions in Differentiable Production Economies," ISER Discussion Paper 0404, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
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- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 294-320, November.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2003. "A solution to the problem of consumption externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 831-847, November.
- Suh, Sang-Chul, 2001. "An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-110, January.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
- Tomas Sjöström, 1994. "Implementation by demand mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 343-354, December.
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