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Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies

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  • Naoki Yoshihara

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Hokkaido University, Kita-Ku Kita 9 Nishi 7, Sapporo, Hokkaido 060-0809, Japan)

Abstract

This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the proportional and equal benefit solutions respectively in Nash and strong Nash equilibria are proposed without assuming free disposal.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 127-151

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:127-151

Note: Received: 7 May 1996 / Accepted: 1 December 1998
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Related research

Keywords: Double implemantation; the proportional solution; the equal benefit solution; natural mechanisms;

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Cited by:
  1. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  2. Suh, Sang-Chul, 2001. "An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-110, January.
  3. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
  4. Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 294-320, November.
  5. Tian, Guoqiang, 2003. "A solution to the problem of consumption externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 831-847, November.
  6. Tomas Sjöström, 1994. "Implementation by demand mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 343-354, December.

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