Choosing and Sharing

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Choosing and Sharing

Author Info

Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti
Justin Leroux () (IEA, HEC Montréal)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Justin T. Leroux

Abstract

Choosing a project for which benefits accrue to all involved agents but brings major costs or additional benefits to only one agent is often problematic. Siting a nationwide nuclear waste disposal or hosting a major sporting event are examples of such a problem: costs or benefits are tied to the identity of the host of the project. Our goals are twofold: to choose the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost or the highest localized surplus) and to share the cost, or surplus, in a predetermined way so as to achieve redistributive goals. We propose a simple mechanism to implement both objectives. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling, is efficient, budget-balanced and immune to coalitional deviations.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 07-13.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0713

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Paper
- Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2009. "Choosing and Sharing," MPRA Paper 14929, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-03-01 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2008-03-01 (Game Theory)
NEP-PPM-2008-03-01 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-61, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2009. "Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context," MPRA Paper 14930, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1297-1313, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Perry, M. & Reny, P.J., 1995. "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Papers 9581, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2009. "Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context," MPRA Paper 14930, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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