Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Multibidding Game under Uncertainty

Contents:

Author Info

  • Róbert F. Veszteg

    ()
    (School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra)

Abstract

This paper considers situations in which a set of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I propose the use of the individually-rational and budget-balanced multibidding mechanism according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules as defined by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) under complete information. It can be applied in a wide range of situations, and its symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria deliver ex post efficient outcomes if the number of players is two - for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty - or very large.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom/files/workingpapersmodule/@random437a054f974a0/1132582623_wp1404.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number 14/04.

as in new window
Length: 36 pages pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp1404

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September.
  2. Rob, R., 1988. "Pollution Claim Settlements Under Private Information," Papers, Tel Aviv 19-88, Tel Aviv.
  3. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  5. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
  6. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  7. David Perez-Castrillo & Robert F. Veszteg, 2005. "Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 638.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. O'Sullivan Arthur, 1993. "Voluntary Auctions for Noxious Facilities: Incentives to Participate and the Efficiency of Siting Decisions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages S12-S26, July.
  9. Ingberman Daniel E., 1995. "Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages S20-S33, November.
  10. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1986. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 295-99, May.
  11. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Perez-Castrillo, David & Veszteg, Robert F., 2007. "Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 394-411, July.
  2. Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Justin Leroux, 2007. "Choosing and Sharing," Cahiers de recherche 07-13, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  3. Pintér, Ágnes & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2010. "Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 36-50, March.
  4. David Perez-Castrillo & Robert F. Veszteg, 2005. "Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 638.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2010. "Smooth multibidding mechanisms," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 849.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. EHLERS, Lars, 2005. "Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2005-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  7. Róbert Veszteg, 2005. "Linking Decisions with Moments," Faculty Working Papers, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra 10/05, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp1404. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.