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Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem

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  • Toyotaka Sakai

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-010-0562-x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 50 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 499-521

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:50:y:2012:i:2:p:499-521

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: NIMBY (Not in my backyard); Market design; Nearly robustness to strategic manipulation; Proportional rule; Manipulation game; Core; D63; D60; C71;

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References

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  1. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
  2. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 227-245, August.
  3. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul & Knez, Peter J. & Yaksick, Rudy, 1987. "A compensation mechanism for siting noxious facilities: Theory and experimental design," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 371-383, December.
  4. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
  5. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  6. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  7. Lars Ehlers, 2009. "Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 505-512, June.
  8. Gustavo Bergantiños & María Gómez-Rúa, 2010. "Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 227-262, May.
  9. Thomson, William, 1984. "The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 447-60, July.
  10. Ohseto, Shinji, 2005. "Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 215-226, September.
  11. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
  12. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  13. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-linear Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 49-67, January.
  14. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
  15. Toyotaka Sakai, 2008. "Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 347-356, November.
  16. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
  17. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2007. "The Manipulability of Fair Solutions in Assignment of an Indivisible Object with Monetary Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 993-1011, December.
  18. Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0646, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  19. Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September.
  20. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 325-348.
  21. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Fujinaka, Yuji & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 253-258, February.
  23. Schummer, James, 2000. "Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 293-318, February.
  24. Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 549-563, June.
  25. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-27, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  2. Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2009. "Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context," MPRA Paper 14930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.

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