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Political Institutions and Growth Collapses

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  • Ugo Panizza
  • Alejandro Gaviria
  • Ernesto H. Stein
  • Jessica Seddon Wallack

Abstract

This paper tests whether Rodrik`s (1999) results that institutions for conflict management are associated with the ability to react to economic shocks are robust to different ways of defining the quality of such institutions. We measure the quality of conflict management institutions with two different indices. The first is an index of political constraints on the ability of the executive to impose its will. These constraints limit the ability of the government to arbitrarily change the rules of the game and therefore may reduce redistributive struggles. The second index measures the degree of political particularism. We define political particularism as the policymakers` ability to further their career by catering to narrow interests rather than broader national platforms. The indices used in this paper solve the endogeneity and subjectivity biases that affect Rodrik`s measure of institutional quality. We find strong support for the idea that high levels of political constraints and intermediate levels of political particularism are associated with a quick recovery from economic shocks.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4207.

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Date of creation: May 2000
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4207

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Cited by:
  1. Malik, Adeel & Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2009. "The geography of output volatility," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 163-178, November.
  2. Islam, Roumeen & Montenegro, Claudio E., 2002. "What determines the quality of institutions?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2764, The World Bank.
  3. Ugo Panizza & Mónica Yañez, 2005. "Why are Latin Americans so unhappy about reforms?," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 1-29, May.
  4. Pitlik, Hans & Wirth, Steffen, 2003. "Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical test," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 565-581, September.
  5. Hallerberg, Mark & Marier, Patrick, 2001. "Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Carribean countries," ZEI Working Papers B 17-2001, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  6. Jairo Parada C. & Alexandra García L., 2008. "Growth and Institutions in Latin America: A pooled and cross-time series analysis (1951-1999)," REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA DEL CARIBE, UNIVERSIDAD DEL NORTE.

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