This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2005-01-23 (All new papers)
• NEP-BEC-2005-01-23 (Business Economics)
• NEP-LAB-2005-01-23 (Labour Economics)
• NEP-LTV-2005-01-23 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)

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4. Sicilian, Paul & Grossberg, Adam J, 2001. "Investment in Human Capital and Gender Wage Differences: Evidence from the NLSY," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 463-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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7. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1999. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages F112-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6740, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Daron Acemoglu & Joern-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets," Working papers 98-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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12. Salop, Joanne & Salop, Steven, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-27, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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14. Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Zoega, Gylfi, 2002. "Oligopsony, Institutions and the Efficiency of General Training," IZA Discussion Papers 618, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
    • Thomas Sargent, . "Matlab code for Jovanovic's matching model," QM&RBC Codes 24, Quantitative Macroeconomics & Real Business Cycles. [Downloadable!]
20. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1999. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 539-572, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1998. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," CEPR Discussion Papers 1833, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Acemoglu, D. & Pischke, J.S., 1997. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," Working papers 97-24, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," NBER Working Papers 6357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Agell, Jonas & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1997. "Minimum wages and the incentives for skill formation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 25-40, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory And Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 78-118, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1996. "Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Acemoglu, D. & Pischki, J.S., 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," Working papers 96-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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24. Joanne Salop & Steve Salop, 1976. "Self-selection and turnover in the labor market," Special Studies Papers 80, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
25. Barron, John M & Berger, Mark C & Black, Dan A, 1997. "How Well Do We Measure Training?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages 507-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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27. Barron, John M & Black, Dan A & Loewenstein, Mark A, 1987. "Employer Size: The Implications for Search, Training, Capital Investment, Starting Wages, and Wage Growth," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(1), pages 76-89, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)