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Wage Compression and the Division of Returns to Productivity Growth: Evidence from EOPP

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Author Info
Harley Frazis () (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics)
Mark A Loewenstein () (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics)
Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between wages and productivity during the early years of an employment relationship. Data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project show that worker productivity grows substantially during the first two years on the job, with most of the growth in productivity occurring at the very start of the job. Correcting for measurement error and the fact that expected productivity beyond the start of the job may be folded into the starting wage if wage revisions are not instantaneous, one finds that variation in productivity is only partially reflected in wages. Not only is productivity growth stemming from human capital accumulation while on the job only partially reflected in wage growth, but starting productivity differences for workers in the same job – in large part driven by differences in relevant experience - are only partially reflected in starting wage differences. Our empirical findings can be explained by a simple model of employer – worker cost sharing in which (a) the cost to a worker of locating and moving to a new job increases with the worker's stock of human capital and (b) equity norms prevent employers from paying senior workers lower wages than junior workers who are no more productive.

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Paper provided by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in its series Working Papers with number 398.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2006
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Handle: RePEc:bls:wpaper:ec060100

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Related research
Keywords: Wages; Productivity; Compression;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Loewenstein, Mark A & Spletzer, James R, 1998. "Dividing the Costs and Returns to General Training," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 142-71, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Peraita, Carlos, 2001. "Testing the Acemoglu-Pischke model in Spain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 107-115, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn, 2005. "Pay Inequality, Pay Secrecy, and Effort: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Booth, Alison L & Zoega, Gylfi, 2001. "Is Wage Compression a Necessary Condition for Firm-Financed General Training?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2845, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bartel, Ann P, 1995. "Training, Wage Growth, and Job Performance: Evidence from a Company Database," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(3), pages 401-25, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 9. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ericson, Thomas, 2004. "The effects of wage compression on training: Swedish empirical evidence," Working Paper Series 2004:15, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Harley Frazis & Mark A. Loewenstein, 2005. "Reexamining the Returns to Training: Functional Form, Magnitude, and Interpretation," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(2). [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ann P. Bartel, 1995. "Training, Wage Growth and Job Performance: Evidence From a Company Database," NBER Working Papers 4027, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Katz, Eliakim & Ziderman, Adrian, 1990. "Investment in General Training: The Role of Information and Labour Mobility," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1147-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Giorgio Brunello, 2002. "Is Training more Frequent when Wage Compression is Higher? Evidence from 11 European Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  16. Alison L Booth & Gylfi Zoega, 2005. "Worker Heterogeneity, Intra-firm Externalities and Wage Compression," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0515, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Lorne Carmichael, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Working Papers 452, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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  18. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1999. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 539-572, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Booth, Alison L. & Bryan, Mark L., 2002. "Who Pays for General Training? New Evidence for British Men and Women," IZA Discussion Papers 486, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  20. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory And Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 78-118, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Thomas J. Kane & Dietmar Harhoff, 1997. "Is the German apprenticeship system a panacea for the U.S. labor market?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-196. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. David H. Autor, 2000. "Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?," NBER Working Papers 7637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Dale T. Mortensen, 1978. "Specific Capital and Labor Turnover," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 572-586, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2008. "Lohnspreizung und Effizienz," Discussion Papers in Economics 2117, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2007. "Wage Dispersion, Over-Qualification, and Reder Competition," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 1(13), pages 1-31. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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