The Efficiency of Training and Hiring with Intra firm Bargaining
AbstractIn a matching and intrafi rm bargaining economy with constant return to scale production and matching technologies, large fi rms hire and train workers efficiently. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large fi rm to take into account the consequences of training on the wages bargained inside the fi rm. This intrafi rm bargaining process solves the hold-up problem that is associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient decisions of hiring and training.
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Date of creation: 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Tripier, Fabien, 2011. "The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 527-538, August.
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2010-04-17 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-HRM-2010-04-17 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2010-04-17 (Labour Economics)
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