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A Theory Of Wages And Labor Demand With Intra-Firm Bargaining And Matching Frictions

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Author Info
Pierre Cahuc
Francois Marque
Etienne Wasmer

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Abstract

This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold-up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital. Copyright © 2008 the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00502.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 49 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Pages: 943-972
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:3:p:943-972

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  1. Winfried Koeniger & Julien Prat, 2007. "Employment Protection, Product Market Regulation and Firm Selection," Working Papers 07-03, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Eran Yashiv, 2006. "Evaluating the Performance of the Search and Matching Model," IZA Discussion Papers 1931, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jean-Pierre Danthine & André Kurmann, 2005. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.08, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Monique Ebell & Christian Haefke, 2009. "Product Market Deregulation and the U.S. Employment Miracle," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(3), pages 479-504, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Yashiv, Eran, 2005. "Evaluating the Performance of the Search and Matching Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 5363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Krause, Michael & Lubik, Thomas A., 2007. "Does intra-firm bargaining matter for business cycle dynamics?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2007,17, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gabriel Felbermayr & Julien Prat, 2007. "Product Market Regulation, Firm Selection and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 2754, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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