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Abstract

This paper takes a network perspective t oinvestigate how rural households in developing countries form the links through which they provide and get economic support. I test the hypothesis that indirect contacts (e.g. friends of friends) matter for link formation. An estimation procedure of a network formation model à la Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is proposed and applied to data on a single village in Tanzania. Results show that when agents evaluate the net advantage of forming a link they also consider the wealth and the position of indirect contacts. The network externalities from indirect contacts are negative, which suggests a mechanism of competition over scarce resources. This paper proposes the first structural estimation of an endogenous network formation model, and also contributes to the development literature by overcoming the dyadic regression approach and providing evidence that village-level network structure has an explanatory value disregarded by all previous studies.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00585968.

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Date of creation: Jun 2010
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00585968

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Keywords: mutual support ; network formation ; structural estimation ; indirect contacts;

References

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1. Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade," Development and Comp Systems 0409022, EconWPA.
   
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   • Marcel Fafchamps, 2002. "Ethnicity and Networks in African Trade," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-20, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
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5. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August.
   
   • Marcel Fafchamps & Susan Lund, . "Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines," Working Papers 97014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
6. Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray, 2003. "Group Formation in Risk--Sharing Arrangements," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 87-113, January.
   
   • Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray, 2003. "Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 87-113.
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   • Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006. "Network formation with heterogeneous players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February.
   • Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Jurjen Kamphorst, 2003. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Economics Discussion Papers 562, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
9. Goldstein, Markus & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2002. "Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? Inclusion and Exclusion in Mutual Insurance Networks in Southern Ghana," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
   
   • Goldstein, Markus & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2003. "Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? Inclusion and Exclusion in Mutual Insurance Networks in Southern Ghana," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0d89m20g, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
   • Markus Goldstein & Elisabeth Sadoulet & Alain de Janvry, 2002. "Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? Inclusion and Exclusion in Mutual Insurance Networks in Southern Ghana," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 32, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
   • Goldstein, Markus & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2003. "Is a friend in need a friend indeed? Inclusion and exclusion in mutual insurance networks in southern Ghana," CUDARE Working Paper Series 978, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
10. John M. Abowd & Henry S. Farber, 1982. "Job queues and the union status of workers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(3), pages 354-367, April.
11. Yann Bramoullé & Rachel Kranon, 2005. "Risk-Sharing Networks," Cahiers de recherche 0526, CIRPEE.
    
    • Bramoullé, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Risk-sharing networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(3-4), pages 275-294.
12. Farber, Henry S, 1983. "The Determination of the Union Status of Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(5), pages 1417-37, September.
13. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1992. "Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 147-74, October.
14. Mace, Barbara J, 1991. "Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 928-56, October.
15. Ligon, Ethan, 1998. "Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 847-64, October.
16. Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers, 2007. "Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random Are Social Networks?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 890-915, June.

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