Are gifts and loans between households voluntary?
AbstractUsing village date from Tanzania, we test whether gifts and loans between households are voluntary while correcting for mis-reporting by the giving and receiving households. Tow maintained assumptions underlie our analysis: answers to a question on who people would turn to for help are good proxies for willingness to link: and, conditional on regressors, the probability of reporting a gift or loan is independent between giving and receiving households. Building on these assumptions, we develop a new estimation methodology and gift giving are voluntary, then both households should, want to rely on each other for help. We find only weak evidence to support bilateral formation. We do, however, find reasonably strong evidence to support unilateral link formation. Results suggest that if a household wishes to enter in a reciprocal relationship with someone who is sufficiently close socially and geographically, it can do so unilaterally.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford in its series CSAE Working Paper Series with number 2010-20.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Risk sharing; reporting bias; social networks;
Other versions of this item:
- Marcel Fafchamps & Margherita Comola, 2010. "Are Gifts and Loans between Households Voluntary?," Economics Series Working Papers CSAE WPS/2010-20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Margherita Comola & Marcel Fafchamps, 2010. "Are gifts and loans between households voluntary?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564894, HAL.
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2010-08-06 (Development)
- NEP-SOC-2010-08-06 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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