Competitive effects of Basel II on U.S. bank credit card lending
Abstract
The authors analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on U.S. bank credit card lending. They find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 07-04 ; Supersedes "Potential competitive effects on U.S. bank credit card lending from the proposed bifurcated application of Basel II", Working Paper 05-29Download Info
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 07-9.Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:07-9
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Related research
Keywords: Basel capital accord ; Credit cards;Other versions of this item:
- Lang, William W. & Mester, Loretta J. & Vermilyea, Todd A., 2008. "Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 478-508, October.
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-04-14 (Banking)
- NEP-REG-2007-04-14 (Regulation)
- NEP-RMG-2007-04-14 (Risk Management)
References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Vermilyea, Todd A. & Webb, Elizabeth R. & Kish, Andrew A., 2008. "Implicit recourse and credit card securitizations: What do fraud losses reveal?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1198-1208, July.
- Bill Yang & Amanda King, 2011. "Do Credit Cards Really Reduce Aggregate Money Holdings?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 39(1), pages 85-95, March.
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