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Who pays for credit cards?

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  • Sujit Chakravorti
  • William R. Emmons

Abstract

We model side payments in a competitive credit-card market. If competitive retailers charge a single (higher) price to cover the cost of accepting cards, banks must subsidize convenience users to prevent them from defecting to merchants who do not accept cards. The side payments will be financed by card users who roll over balances at interest if their subjective discount rates are high enough. Despite the feasibility of cross subsidies among cardholders, price discrimination without side payments is Pareto preferred because of the costliness of the card network--unless banks have other motives, such as purchasing options on future borrowing by convenience users.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Occasional Paper; Emerging Payments with number EPS-2001-1.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhop:eps-2001-1

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Related research

Keywords: Credit cards ; Payment systems;

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References

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  1. Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, 1995. "Consumer behavior and the stickiness of credit card interest rates," Working Papers 95-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  2. Baxter, William F, 1983. "Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 541-88, October.
  3. JOHN M. Barron & MICHAEL E. Staten & JOHN Umbeck, 1992. "Discounts For Cash In Retail Gasoline Marketing," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 10(4), pages 89-102, October.
  4. Kitch, Edmund W, 1990. "The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit Card Issuer Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 217-33, Spring.
  5. Brito, Dagobert L & Hartley, Peter R, 1995. "Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 400-433, April.
  6. Flint Brayton & Eileen Mauskopf & David Reifschneider & Peter Tinsley & John Williams, 1997. "The role of expectations in the FRB/US macroeconomic model," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Apr, pages 227-245.
  7. Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1991. "The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 50-81, March.
  8. Hester, Donald D, 1972. "Monetary Policy in the 'Checkless' Economy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 279-93, May.
  9. Kirstin E. Wells, 1996. "Are checks overused?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 2-12.
  10. Joanna Stavins, 1996. "Can demand elasticities explain sticky credit card rates?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jul, pages 43-54.
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