Efficiency of stability-oriented institutions: the European case
AbstractStability-oriented European institutions correspond to the general prescriptions of the ‘new macroeconomics consensus’. This contribution provides an assessment of the pros and cons of these institutions in terms of macro stabilisation and exchange-rate swings drawing on different scenarios. We argue that the institutions which have been associated with the Euro – limits on public deficits and a conservative central bank – have somewhat jeopardized the efficiency of this new exchange-rate regime. Adaptation of institutions is thus needed: either cooperation or coordination may enhance European welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE) in its series Documents de Travail de l'OFCE with number 2007-06.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
monetary policy; fiscal policy; central bank; stability pact; time-consistency; exchange rate; cooperation; coordination;
Other versions of this item:
- Fabrice Capoen & Jérôme Creel, 2007. "Efficiency of stability-oriented institutions: the European case," Sciences Po publications NÂ°2007-06, Sciences Po.
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
- H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-03-17 (Central Banking)
- NEP-EEC-2007-03-17 (European Economics)
- NEP-IFN-2007-03-17 (International Finance)
- NEP-MAC-2007-03-17 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-03-17 (Public Economics)
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