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Internal and External Policy Coordination: a Dynamic Analysis

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Author Info
Fabrice Capoen
Pierre Villa
Abstract

We study in a dynamic framework the conflict between government and the central bank with respect to the exchange rate regime, the nature of the expectations of prices and exchange rate regimes (flexible, fixed, EMU), convergence criteria such as the public debt/GDP ratio. The method consists in calculating Perfect Nash Equilibria between authorities and then modelling "internal and external co-ordination" by a Dynamic Nash-Bargaining procedure.

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Paper provided by CEPII research center in its series Working Papers with number 1997-15.

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Date of creation: Nov 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cii:cepidt:1997-15

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Related research
Keywords: EXCHANGE RATE; PRICES; CENTRAL BANKS; GOVERNMENT;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models
E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Cohen, Daniel & Michel, Philippe, 1988. "How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2), pages 263-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Vidalis, Nic, 1987. "International Cooperation and Reputation in an Empirical Two-Bloc Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 198, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall. [Downloadable!]
  5. Douven, R. C. & Engwerda, J. C., 1995. "Is there room for convergence in the E.C.?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 113-130, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Douven, R. & Plasmans, J., 1995. "Convergence and International Policy Coordination in the EU: A Dynamic Games Approach," Papers 9596, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  7. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kahn, Charles M, 1980. "The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1305-11, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Fabrice Capoen & Jerome Creel, 2007. "Efficiency of stability-oriented institutions: the European case," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-06, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
  2. Fabrice Capoen & Jerome Creel & Pascal Cussy & Hélène Lenoble-Liaud, 2000. "How to manage speculative shocks: intra-European vs. International monetary coordination," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2000-01, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
  3. Jerome Creel, 1999. "The Stability Pact and Feedback Policy Effects," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 1999-02, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
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