We study in a dynamic framework the conflict between government and the central bank with respect to the exchange rate regime, the nature of the expectations of prices and exchange rate regimes (flexible, fixed, EMU), convergence criteria such as the public debt/GDP ratio. The method consists in calculating Perfect Nash Equilibria between authorities and then modelling "internal and external co-ordination" by a Dynamic Nash-Bargaining procedure.
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Paper provided by CEPII research center in its series Working Papers with number
1997-15.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
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