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Faut-il contraindre la politique budgétaire en union monétaire ? Les enseignements d’une maquette simulée

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  • Jérôme Creel

    (OFCE)

Abstract

Des discussions récentes, au niveau européen, ont ravivé les inquiétudes des détracteurs du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance. Le 12 février 2001, les ministres des Finances des pays de l’UE, moins celui de l’Irlande, ont condamné publiquement sa politique budgétaire et ont recommandé à son gouvernement qu’il « mette un terme à la non-conformité de son budget 2001 avec les grandes orientations de politique économique » adoptées par le Conseil européen en juin 2000. Cette recommandation, qui révèle une lecture très stricte du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, est paradoxale : d’une part, les performances macroéconomiques irlandaises lui ont permis d’accumuler des excédents publics records ; d’autre part, la condamnation par les Quatorze d’une politique budgétaire pro-cyclique tranche avec les exhortations des années 1990 à assainir les finances publiques en Europe alors que l’UE subissait une grave crise économique ! Pour étudier les conséquences du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance, nous avons construit une maquette à deux pays en union monétaire dont les valeurs initiales et les multiplicateurs sont basés sur l’économie française et sur des résultats issus du modèle MIMOSA (...).

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Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number info:hdl:2441/2943.

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Date of creation: Apr 2001
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Publication status: Published in Revue de l'OFCE, 2001, pp.199-249
Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2943

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