Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union
AbstractWe analyse the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus exchange rate arrangements and show how the relative performance of a currency union depends on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority's objective function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics in its series Trinity Economics Papers with number 994.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
monetary union; stabilization.;
Other versions of this item:
- Lane, Philip R, 2000. " Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(4), pages 585-604, December.
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
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