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Stabilization policy in a currency union

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  • Lane, Philip R.

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  • Lane, Philip R., 1996. "Stabilization policy in a currency union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-60, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:53:y:1996:i:1:p:53-60
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buiter, Willem H. & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo, 1995. "A Centre-Periphery Model of Monetary Coordination and Exchange Rate Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 1201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Chang Roberto, 1995. "Bargaining a Monetary Union," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, June.
    3. Canzoneri,Matthew B. & Grilli,Vittorio & Masson,Paul R. (ed.), 1992. "Establishing a Central Bank," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521420983.
    4. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "Participation in a Currency Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 847-863, September.
    5. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Rogers, Carol Ann, 1990. "Is the European Community an Optimal Currency Area? Optimal Taxation versus the Cost of Multiple Currencies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 419-433, June.
    6. Martin, Philippe, 1995. "Free-riding, convergence and two-speed monetary unification in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1345-1364, August.
    7. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787, December.
    9. Alesina, Alberto F & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "On the Feasibility of a One- or Multi-Speed European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
    2. Andersson, Fredrik & Forslid, Rikard, 2004. "A fundamental asymmetry of asymmetric shocks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-351, April.
    3. Philip R. Lane, 2000. "Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(4), pages 585-604, December.
    4. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2005. "A model of monetary unification under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15.
    5. Øistein RØisland & Ragnar Torvik, 2003. "Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 99-118, April.
    6. René Cabral-Torres, "undated". "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination," Discussion Papers 05/28, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Mahvash S Qureshi & Mr. Charalambos G Tsangarides, 2006. "What is Fuzzy About Clustering in West Africa?," IMF Working Papers 2006/090, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Pasquale Foresti, 2012. "Rules Versus Discretion Under Asymmetric Shocks," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1180-1190.

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