This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Centre-Periphery Model of Monetary Coordination and Exchange Rate Crises

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Buiter, Willem H
Corsetti, Giancarlo
Pesenti, Paolo

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The paper analyses the modalities and consequences of a breakdown of cooperation between the monetary authorities of inflation-prone periphery countries that use an exchange rate peg as an anti-inflationary device, when the centre is hit by an aggregate demand shock. Cooperation in the periphery is constrained to be symmetric: costs and benefits must be equal for all. Our model suggests that there are at least two ways in which a generalized crisis of the exchange rate system may emerge.The first is when the constrained cooperative response of the periphery is a moderate common devaluation while the non-cooperative equilibrium has large devaluations by a few countries. An exchange rate crisis emerges if periphery countries give in to their individual incentives to renege on the cooperative agreement. In the second case, the centre shock is not large enough to trigger a general devaluation in the constrained cooperative equilibrium; yet some of the periphery countries would devalue in the Nash equilibrium, making the monetary stance in the system more expansionary. In this case, reversion to Nash is collectively rational. We offer this model as a useful parable for interpreting the collapse of the ERM in 1992-3.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP1201.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1201.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1201

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Centre-Periphery; Exchange Rate Crises; Monetary Policy Coordination;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Gerlach, Stefan & Smets, Frank, 1994. "Contagious Speculative Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1055, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Ozkan, F Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1995. "Policy Measures to Avoid a Currency Crisis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(429), pages 510-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Masson, Paul R, 1995. "Gaining and Losing ERM Credibility: The Case of the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 571-82, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Gulcin Ozkan & Alan Sutherland, . "A Currency Crisis Model with an Optimising Policymaker," Discussion Papers 96/11, Department of Economics, University of York.
    Other versions:
  7. de Kock, Gabriel & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "Fiscal Policies and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 347-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Maurice Obstfeld., 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C96-075, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Weber, Axel A., 1997. "Sources of Currency Crisis: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Paper Serie B 418, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marion Kohler, . "Optimal currency areas and customs unions: are they connected?," Bank of England working papers 89, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  3. Maurice Obstfeld, 1997. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features," NBER Working Papers 5285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Balogun, Emmanuel Dele, 2008. "An Empirical Test of Trade Gravity Model Criteria for the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)," MPRA Paper 7083, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Balogun, Emmanuel Dele, 2008. "An alternative reconsideration of macroeconomic convergence criteria for West African Monetary Zone," MPRA Paper 11367, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jesper Rangvid, 1997. "Deviations from long-run equilibria and probabilities of devaluations: An empirical analysis of Danish realignments," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 497-522, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Axel A. Weber, 1998. "Sources of currency crises: an empirical analysis," Working Papers 25, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank). [Downloadable!]
  8. Balogun, Emmanuel Dele, 2009. "Alternative reconsideration of output growth differrential for the West African Monetary Zone," MPRA Paper 13416, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Balogun, Emmanuel Dele, 2007. "Monetary policy and economic performance of West African Monetary Zone Countries," MPRA Paper 4308, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marion Kohler, . "Coalition formation in international monetary policy games," Bank of England working papers 92, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Lodovico Pizzati, 2000. "Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt," Empirica, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 389-409, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. W.H. Buiter, 1995. "Macroeconomic Policy During a Transition to Monetary Union," CEP Discussion Papers dp0261, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  13. Kohler, Marion, 2004. "Competing Coalitions in International Monetary Policy Games," Discussion Paper Series 26274, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Chantal Dupasquier & Patrick N. Osakwe & Shandre M. Thangavelu, 2005. "Choice of Monetary and Exchange Regimes in ECOWAS: An Optimum Currency Area Analysis," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0510, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE. [Downloadable!]
  15. Loisel, Olivier & Martin, Philippe, 1999. "Coordination, Cooperation, Contagion and Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 2075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.