Status and Incentives
AbstractThe paper introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. It is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status is decreased. Higher status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert a higher effort in exchange for an improved status. Results are coherent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensations are delayed; past performances are recompensed by pay increases along with an improved status within the organization's hierarchy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2007-01.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33
Web page: http://thema.u-cergy.fr
More information through EDIRC
repeated moral hazard; internal labor markets; social status;
Other versions of this item:
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Renault, Régis, 2007. "Status and Incentives," IDEI Working Papers 451, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Renault, Régis & Auriol, Emmanuelle, 2008. "Status and incentives," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12479, Paris Dauphine University.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-01-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2007-01-23 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December.
- G. S Becker & K. M Murphy & Ivan Werning, 2000. "Status, Lotteries, and Inequality," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 160, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Fershtman, C. & Weiss,Y., 1995.
"Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable Preferences,"
32-95, Tel Aviv.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Weiss, Yoram, 1998. "Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 53-73, October.
- Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y., 1996. "Social Rewards Externalities and Stable Preferences," Papers 17-96, Tel Aviv.
- Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y., 1996. "Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable preferences," Discussion Paper 1996-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Andrew Postlewaite, .
""The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences'',"
CARESS Working Papres
97-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Sheryl Ball & Catherine Eckel & Philip J. Grossman & William Zame, 2001. "Status In Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 161-188, February.
- Ball, Sheryl & Eckel, Catherine C., 1998.
"The Economic Value of Status,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics),
Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 495-514.
- Ball, Sheryl & Eckel, Catherine C., 1998. "The economic value of status," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 495-514.
- Hashimoto, Masanori & Raisian, John, 1985. "Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 721-35, September.
- Salop, Joanne & Salop, Steven, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-27, November.
- Raghuram Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2004.
"Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?,"
NBER Working Papers
10494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Hvide, Hans K & Weiss, Yoram, 2003. "Cultural Diversity, Status Concerns and the Organization of Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 3982, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yoram Weiss & Chaim Fershtman, 1997.
"Social Status and Economic Performance: A Survey,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
139, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Robert H. Topel & Michael P. Ward, 1988.
"Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men,"
NBER Working Papers
2649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emmanuelle AURIOL & Régis RENAULT, 2001.
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,
ENSAE, issue 63-64, pages 261-282.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2006.
"The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 759-773, November.
- Raghuram Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2003. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies," NBER Working Papers 9633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ghemawat, Pankaj, 1995. "Competitive Advantage and Internal Organization: Nucor Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(4), pages 685-717, Winter.
- Robert H. Frank, 1984. "Interdependent Preferences and the Competitive Wage Structure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 510-520, Winter.
- John J. Abowd & John Haltiwanger & Julia Lane, 2004.
"Integrated Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data for the United States,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 224-229, May.
- John M. Abowd & John C. Haltiwanger & Julia I. Lane, 2004. "Integrated Longitudinal Employee-Employer Data for the United States," Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Technical Papers 2004-02, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- Gerhart, B. & Milkovick, G.T., 1992. "Employee Compensation: Research and Practice," Papers 92-26, Cornell - Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1991. "Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 89-110, Spring.
- Erica Groshen & David Levine, 1998. "The rise and decline(?) of U.S. internal labor markets," Research Paper 9819, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 9.
- MALCOMSON, James M. & SPINNEWYN, Frans, .
"The multiperiod principal-agent problem,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-803, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y. & Hvide, H.K., 2001. "Status Concerns and the Organization of Work," Papers 2001-2, Tel Aviv.
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Macho, Ines & Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1994.
"Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1527-1553, October.
- Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, P. & Salanié, B., 1989. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets," DELTA Working Papers 89-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, p. & Salanie, B., 1994. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Acces to Credit Markets," Papers 06, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
- Paul Oyer, 2005. "Salary or Benefits?," NBER Working Papers 11817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2004. "The Structure of Wages and Internal Mobility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 212-216, May.
- Davis, Steven J. & Haltiwanger, John, 1999. "Gross job flows," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 2711-2805 Elsevier.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marion Oury).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.