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Introduction to Judgment Aggregation

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Abstract

This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment ag­gregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propo­sitions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this intro­duction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impos­sibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous impossibilities, as discussed in the symposium. We then consider each of four possible escape-routes explored in the symposium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1753.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory (March 2010), 145(2): 441-466
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1753

Note: CFP 1297
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Keywords: Judgment aggregation; Arrow's theorem; Escape routes;

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References

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  1. Dietrich, Franz, 2010. "The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 603-638, March.
  2. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 19-33, July.
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  6. Saporiti, Alejandro, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
  7. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2008. "A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 59-78, June.
  8. Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
  9. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2010. "Majority voting on restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 512-543, March.
  10. Franz Dietrich, 2005. "The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas," Public Economics 0504002, EconWPA.
  11. Mongin, Philippe, 2008. "Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 100-113, July.
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  28. Martin Hees, 2007. "The limits of epistemic democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 649-666, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Herzberg, Frederik & Eckert, Daniel, 2012. "The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: Impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 41-47.
  2. Hannu Salonen, 2012. "Aggregating And Updating Information," Discussion Papers 73, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  3. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins, 2012. "A measure of distance between judgment sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 855-867, October.
  4. Perote-Pena, Juan & Piggins, Ashley, 2012. "A model of deliberative and aggregative democracy," MPRA Paper 48914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. David S Ahn & Santiago Oliveros, 2010. "The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000268, David K. Levine.
  6. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m2e02cub3 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley, 2013. "Many-valued judgment aggregation: Characterizing the possibility/impossibility boundary," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 793-805.
  8. Hervé Crès & Itzhak Gilboa, & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "Bureaucracy in Quest for Feasibility," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7d, Sciences Po.
  9. Philippe Mongin, 2012. "The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 315-355, September.

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