A model of deliberative and aggregative democracy
AbstractWe present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. In our model, individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is “truth-revealing”. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of the original profile of judgements and irrespective of the size of the electorate (provided the latter is finite).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48914.
Date of creation: 23 Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Social choice theory; deliberative democracy; epistemic perspective.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010.
"Introduction to Judgment Aggregation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
1753, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- John List & Matti Liski, 2005. "Introduction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 121-121, 06.
- Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 27900, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Broome, John, 2006.
OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press,
Oxford University Press, number 9780199297702, October.
- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Muriel Gilardone & Antoinette Baujard, 2013. "Individual judgments and social choice in Sen's idea of justice and democracy," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for political Economy 2013-03-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.