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A model of deliberative and aggregative democracy

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  • Perote-Pena, Juan
  • Piggins, Ashley

Abstract

We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. In our model, individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is “truth-revealing”. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of the original profile of judgements and irrespective of the size of the electorate (provided the latter is finite).

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48914/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48914.

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Date of creation: 23 Aug 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48914

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Related research

Keywords: Social choice theory; deliberative democracy; epistemic perspective.;

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  1. Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010. "Introduction to Judgment Aggregation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1753, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. John List & Matti Liski, 2005. "Introduction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 121-121, 06.
  3. Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 27900, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Broome, John, 2006. "Weighing Lives," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199297702, October.
  5. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Muriel Gilardone & Antoinette Baujard, 2013. "Individual judgments and social choice in Sen's idea of justice and democracy," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for political Economy 2013-03-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.

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