Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Christian List

    ()

Abstract

Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the paradox converges to 1, and when it converges to 0, as the number of individuals increases. Drawing on the Condorcet jury theorem and work by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2001, 2003), I use the model to assess the “truth-tracking” performance of two decision procedures, the premise- and conclusion-based procedures. I compare the present results with existing results on the probability of Condorcet’s paradox. I suggest that the doctrinal paradox is likely to occur under plausible conditions. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0253-7
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
Pages: 3-32

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:3-32

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Philippe Mongin, 2012. "The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 315-355, September.
  2. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012. "Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Osherson, Daniel & Vardi, Moshe Y., 2006. "Aggregating disparate estimates of chance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 148-173, July.
  4. Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27900, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19299, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2013. "Epistemic Democracy With Defensible Premises," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(01), pages 87-120, March.
  7. Laffond, G. & Laine, J., 2006. "Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-66, July.
  8. Franz Dietrich, 2004. "Terrorism Prevention: A General Model," Others 0404001, EconWPA.
  9. Dietrich, Franz, 2011. "Scoring rules for judgment aggregation," MPRA Paper 35657, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. List, Christian & Polak, Ben, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 441-466, March.
  11. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 5812, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  13. Franz Dietrich, 2014. "Scoring rules for judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 873-911, April.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:3-32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.