Terrorism Prevention: A General Model
AbstractIn this paper, I present and discuss a method for modelling an important trade-off faced by terrorism prevention policies: the trade-off between, on the one hand, trying to reduce people's inclination towards terrorism, and, on the other hand, trying to protect society against existing terrorists. In general, cause-related policies reduce inclination towards terrorism (first goal), involving measures such as raising the standard of living, and symptom-related policies reduce the power of terrorists (second goal), involving measures such as capturing and detaining terrorists. But, crucially, symptom-related policies also affect the inclination towards terrorism, through (desirable) deterrence and (undesirable) 'hate effects'. If 'hate effects' dominate over deterrence, more toughness overall increases inclination, possibly overcompensating the 'capture success'. So, symptom-related policies may face a trade-off between capturing terrorists, and thereby possibly creating new terrorists. Through the modelling method presented, both policy goals are simultaneously taken into account.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Others with number 0404001.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31. pdf-file (originally written in latex)
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terrorism; threat; war; symptom-related policy; cause-related policy; development policy; development aid; deterrence; hate effect; trade-off; game theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P - Economic Systems
- Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics
- Z - Other Special Topics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-04-04 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers 137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
- Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
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