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Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information

Author

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  • Zoi Terzopoulou

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Ulle Endriss

    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

We introduce a model of judgment aggregation in which individuals do not necessarily have full information regarding the judgments held by their peers. This intuitively limits an individual’s ability to strategically manipulate the aggregation process. Our results confirm this basic intuition. Specifically, we show that known impossibility results concerning the existence of reasonable strategyproof judgment aggregation rules break down once we abandon the classical assumption of full information. For instance, the simple plurality rule is strategyproof in case individuals do not have any information about their peers, while the well-known premise-based rule can be rendered strategyproof by withholding only a negligible amount of information.

Suggested Citation

  • Zoi Terzopoulou & Ulle Endriss, 2019. "Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 415-442, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:53:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01191-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01191-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zoi Terzopoulou & Ulle Endriss, 2022. "Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 363-385, March.
    2. Terzopoulou, Zoi, 2020. "Quota rules for incomplete judgments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 23-36.
    3. Gori, Michele, 2021. "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 350-369.
    4. Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré, 2022. "The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(4), pages 863-895, May.

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