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A Representation Theorem For Voting With Logical Consequences

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  • G RDENFORS, PETER
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    Abstract

    This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow s impossibility theorem.

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    File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S026626710600085X
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 02 (July)
    Pages: 181-190

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    Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:22:y:2006:i:02:p:181-190_00

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    Cited by:
    1. Christian List, 2007. "Group deliberation and the transformation ofjudgments: an impossibility result," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 26, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    2. Frederik Herzberg, 2008. "Judgment aggregation functions and ultraproducts," Working Papers 405, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    3. Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation," MPRA Paper 8412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Christian List, 2007. "Group deliberation and the transformation of judgments: an impossibility result," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19273, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Dokow, Elad & Holzman, Ron, 2010. "Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 544-561, March.

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