This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Possibility Theorem on Aggregation Over Multiple Interconnected Propositions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Christian List

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Drawing on the so-called `doctrinal paradox`, List and Pettit (2002a) have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions similar to the conditions of Arrow`s theorem. I prove that we can avoid the paradox and the associated impossibility result by introducing an appropriate domain restriction: a structure condition, called unidimensional alignment, is shown to open up a possibiity result, similar in spirit to Black`s median voter theorem (1948). Specifically, I prove that, given unidimensional alignment, propositionwise majority voting is the unique procedure for aggregating individul sets of judgments into collective ones in accordance with the above mentioned minimal conditions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Research/wp/pdf/paper123.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 123.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:123

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Mark George).

Related research
Keywords: aggregation beliefs propositional logic domain restriction unidimensional alignment

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Brennan, Geoffrey, 2001. "Collective coherence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 197-211, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP48, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2003. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 237, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "The geometry of consistent majoritarian judgement aggregation," MPRA Paper 9608, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Christian List, 2007. "Group deliberation and the transformation ofjudgments: an impossibility result," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 26, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Judgment aggregation by quota rules," Public Economics 0501005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.