The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas
AbstractWithin social choice theory, the new field of judgment aggregation aims at reaching collective judgments on a set of logically interconnected propositions. I investigate decision problems, in which the agenda is a network, composed of atomic propositions and connection rules between them. Networks can represent various realistic decision problems, including most concrete examples given in the literature. Nevertheless, networks are unexplored so far due to problems when modelling connection rules in standard propositional logic. By extending the logic, I prove that, for any network, decision rules satisfying the common conditions always exist, in contrast to the literature's emphasis on impossibilities. I also characterise the class of such decision rules, and propose a simple way to select a decision rule.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0504002.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 05 Apr 2005
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20
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judgment aggregation; collective inconsistency; possibility theorems; network; connection rule; formal logic; material conditional; subjunctive conditional;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
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