Judgment aggregation in general logics
AbstractWithin social choice theory, the new field of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Commonly, judgment aggregation is studied using standard propositional logic, with a limited expressive power and a problematic representation of conditional statements ('if P then Q') as material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a generalised model, in which most realistic decision problems can be represented. The model is not restricted to a particular logic but is open to several logics, including standard propositional logic, predicate calculi, modal logics and conditional logics. To illustrate the model, I prove an impossibility theorem, which generalises earlier results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0505007.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 18 May 2005
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judgement aggregation; discursive dilemma; modelling methodology; formal logics; impossibility theorem;
Other versions of this item:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
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