Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000037, David K. Levine.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1997.
"Games with Procedurally Rational Players,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
1997-02, McMaster University.
- David P. Myatt, 2000. "The New Theory of Strategic Voting," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1586, Econometric Society.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
- Rubinstein, A. & Spiegler, R., 2008.
"Money pumps in the market,"
Open Access publications from University College London
http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
- Markus Haavio & Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2009.
"The Political Economy of Sin Taxes,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2650, CESifo Group Munich.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Signaling In A Dynamic Contest With Boundedly Rational Players," Working Papers 0510, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
- Rani Spiegler, 2005.
"The Market for Quacks,"
784828000000000634, UCLA Department of Economics.
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