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The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem

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  • David S Ahn
  • Santiago Oliveros

Abstract

Should two issues be decided jointly by a single committee or in separately by different committees? Similarly, should two defendants be tried together in a joint trial or tried separately in severed trials? Multiplicity of issues or defendants introduces novel strategic considerations. As in the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, we consider large committees with common values and incomplete information. Our main result is that the joint trial by a single committee can aggregate information if and only if the severed trials by separate committees can aggregate information. Specifically, suppose that either for the joint trial or for the severed trials there exists a sequence of equilibria that implements the optimal outcome with probability approaching one as the number of voters goes to infinity. Then a sequence of equilibria with similar asymptotic efficiency exists for the other format. Thus, the advantage of either format cannot hinge on pure information aggregation with many signals.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 661465000000000268.

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Date of creation: 18 Oct 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000268

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  1. David S. Ahn & Santiago Oliveros, 2010. "Combinatorial Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000263, David K. Levine.
  2. Bozbay Irem & Dietrich Franz & Peters Hans, 2011. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Christian List & Ben Polak, 2010. "Introduction to Judgment Aggregation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1753, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012. "Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Bozbay, Irem, 2012. "Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues," Working Papers 2012:31, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  6. John List & Matti Liski, 2005. "Introduction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 121-121, 06.
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Cited by:
  1. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2014. "On the Optimal Composition of Committees," CESifo Working Paper Series 4685, CESifo Group Munich.

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