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Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation

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  • Mongin, Philippe

Abstract

According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 141 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 100-113

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:141:y:2008:i:1:p:100-113

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2004. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," Public Economics, EconWPA 0404007, EconWPA, revised 25 Jul 2005.
  2. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
  3. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
  4. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
  5. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
  6. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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