Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation
AbstractAccording to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. The author shows that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 854.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Mongin, Philippe, 2008. "Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 100-113, July.
- Philippe Mongin, 2005. "Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation," Working Papers hal-00243010, HAL.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007.
"Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation,"
Economics and Philosophy,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(03), pages 269-300, November.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2004. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," Public Economics 0404007, EconWPA, revised 25 Jul 2005.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 09, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
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