Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation
AbstractIn response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgements on logically connected propositions into collective judgements, it is often asked whether judgement aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general impossibility theorem, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgement aggregation and prove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theorem in judgement aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgement and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgement aggregation model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0504007.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 22 Apr 2005
Date of revision: 10 Sep 2005
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10
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judgement aggregation; formal logic; preference aggregation; Arrow's Theorem; discursive dilemma;
Other versions of this item:
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-15414, Maastricht University.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000546, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 13, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Franz Dietrich, 2007.
"A generalised model of judgment aggregation,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 529-565, June.
- Franz Dietrich, 2005. "Judgment aggregation in general logics," Public Economics 0505007, EconWPA.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2007. "A generalised model of judgment aggregation," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-15416, Maastricht University.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2006.
"Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-15418, Maastricht University.
- Nehring, Klaus, 2003. "Arrow's theorem as a corollary," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 379-382, September.
- Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
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