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Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility

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  • Geys, Benny
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Qari, Salmai

Abstract

For patriotic citizens, living in their native country is intrinsically preferable compared to living in the diaspora. In this paper, we analyze the implications of such a patriotic lock-in in a world with international migration and redistributive taxation. In a formal model of redistribution with international migration and fiscal competition we derive the main hypothesis: that countries with a more patriotic population should have higher redistributive taxes. Using ISSP survey data and combining them with OECD taxation data, we find robust evidence suggesting that a) higher patriotism is associated with higher tax burdens, and b) this relation is stronger for the upper-middle range of the income distribution.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7216.

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Date of creation: Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7216

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Keywords: fiscal competition; international mobility; patriotism; redistribution; taxation;

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Cited by:
  1. Qari, Salmai & Konrad, Kai A. & Geys, Benny, 2009. "Patriotism, Taxation and International Mobility," IZA Discussion Papers 4120, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Seele, Peter, 2011. ""If your letter was in German, I would not understand a bit, and would have ignored that": Preliminary findings from a survey of highly skilled migrants from India and China with working/edu," Discussion Papers 14/2011, Witten/Herdecke University, Faculty of Management and Economics.
  3. Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan & Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "Nice Guys Finish Last: Are People with Higher Tax Morale Taxed more Heavily?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3858, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Tobias König & Andreas Wagener, 2012. "Culture and Tax Structures," CESifo Working Paper Series 3748, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Koenig, Tobias & Wagener, Andreas, 2013. "Tax structure and government expenditures with tax equity concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 137-153.
  6. Konrad, Kai A. & Qari, Salmai, 2012. "The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?," Munich Reprints in Economics 13960, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

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