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Nice Guys Finish Last: Are People with Higher Tax Morale Taxed more Heavily?

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Listed:
  • Philipp Doerrenberg
  • Denvil Duncan
  • Clemens Fuest
  • Andreas Peichl

Abstract

This paper provides evidence of efficient taxation of groups with heterogeneous levels of ‘tax morale’. We set up an optimal income tax model where high tax morale implies a high subjective cost of evading taxes. The model predicts that ‘nice guys finish last’: groups with higher tax morale will be taxed more heavily, simply because taxing them is less costly. Based on unique cross-country micro data and an IV approach to rule out reverse causality, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. Income groups with high tax morale systematically face higher average and marginal tax rates. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate whether differences in tax morale affect the distribution of the tax burden across different groups of taxpayers.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan & Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "Nice Guys Finish Last: Are People with Higher Tax Morale Taxed more Heavily?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3858, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3858
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. We need more tax inspectors
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-04-13 19:53:00
    2. Why We Want a Complicated Tax System: So That People Can Avoid Taxes
      by Tim Worstall in Tim Worstall (Forbes) on 2012-04-14 19:26:18

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    Cited by:

    1. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2014. "Experimental evidence on the relationship between tax evasion opportunities and labor supply," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 48-70.
    2. Joseph Nyamapheni & Zurika Robinson, 2022. "How can different currency regimes affect the willingness to pay tax? Tax morale evidence from Zimbabwe," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 2156678-215, December.
    3. Andras Simonovits, 2012. "Does higher tax morale imply higher optimal labor income tax rate?," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1218, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    4. Andras Simonovits, 2013. "A family of simple paternalistic transfer models," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1324, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Andras Simonovits, 2013. "Does Higher Tax Morale Imply Higher Optimal Labor Income Tax Rate?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 97-114, June.
    6. Abeler, Johannes & Becker, Anke & Falk, Armin, 2014. "Representative evidence on lying costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 96-104.
    7. Hendel, Ulrich, 2012. "The Influence of Altruistic Preferences on the Race to the Bottom of Welfare States," Discussion Papers in Economics 13999, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Andras Simonovits, 2011. "Higher tax morale implies a higher optimal income tax rate," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1137, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax morale; tax compliance; optimal taxation; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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