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Expectations and Contagion in Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

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  • Tood Keister

    ()
    (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))

Abstract

This paper shows how expectations-driven contagion of currency crises can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when viewed in isolation. The model of Morris and Shin (1998) is extended to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market. If speculators believe that a devaluation of this other currency will make a domestic devaluation more likely, they will engage in trades that link the two markets. A sharp devaluation of the other currency will then be propagated to the domestic market and will increase the likelihood of a crisis there, fulfilling the original expectations. Even though this contagion is driven solely by expectations, the model places restrictions on observable variables, and these restrictions are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence.

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File URL: http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/keister/05-01.pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number 0501.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:0501

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References

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  1. Gerlach, Stefan & Smets, Frank, 1994. "Contagious Speculative Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1055, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Sources of contagion: is it finance or trade?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-308, August.
  3. Reuven Glick & Ramon Moreno & Mark Spiegel, 2001. "Financial crises in emerging markets," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue mar.23.
  4. Stephen Morris & Hyun S Shin, 2001. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001080, David K. Levine.
  5. Hellwig, Christian & Veldkamp, Laura, 2007. "Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers 6506, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  7. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: Unique equilibrium and transparency," Munich Reprints in Economics 19430, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December.
  9. Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Reinhart, Carmen M., 2000. "On crises, contagion, and confusion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 145-168, June.
  10. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K & Wyplosz, Charles, 1996. "Contagious Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 1453, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  14. Reuven Glick & Andrew K. Rose, 1998. "Contagion and Trade: Why Are Currency Crises Regional?," NBER Working Papers 6806, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Paul R. Masson, 1999. "Multiple Equilibria, Contagion, and the Emerging Market Crises," IMF Working Papers 99/164, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Frank Heinemann, 2000. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 316-318, March.
  17. Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  18. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew & Wyplosz, Charles, 1996. " Contagious Currency Crises: First Tests," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 98(4), pages 463-84, December.
  19. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2205-2230, November.
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  21. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1359-1377, November.
  22. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Government policy and the probability of coordination failures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 939-973, May.
  23. Amil Dasgupta, 2004. "Financial Contagion Through Capital Connections: A Model of the Origin and Spread of Bank Panics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1049-1084, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Huberto M. Ennis, 2005. "Complementariedades y Política Macroeconómica," Department of Economics, Working Papers 054, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
  2. Tai-kuang Ho & Ming-yen Wu, 2012. "Third-person Effect and Financial Contagion in the Context of a Global Game," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 823-846, November.
  3. Junichi Fujimoto, 2014. "Speculative Attacks with Multiple Targets," CARF F-Series CARF-F-340, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  4. Agata Kliber, 2011. "Sovereign CDS Instruments in Central Europe – Linkages and Interdependence," Dynamic Econometric Models, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 11, pages 111-128.
  5. Tamgac, Unay, 2011. "Crisis and self-fulfilling expectations: The Turkish experience in 1994 and 2000-2001," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 44-58, January.
  6. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00177058 is not listed on IDEAS

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