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Teacher Quality and Incentives: Theoretical and Empirical Effects of Standards on Teacher Quality

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  • Hendrik Jürges
  • Wolfram F. Richter
  • Kerstin Schneider

Abstract

Applying the theory of yardstick competition to the schooling system, we show that it is optimal to have central tests of student achievement and to engage in benchmarking because it raises the quality of teaching. This is true even if teachers’ pay (defined in monetary terms) is not performance related. If teachers value reputation, and if teaching output is measured so that it becomes comparable, teachers will increase their effort. The theory is tested using the German PISA-E data. Our estimates suggest that, despite the flat career profile of German teachers, the quality of teaching tends to be higher in federal states with central exams.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1296.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1296

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Keywords: education; teacher quality; central examinations; yardstick competition; matching;

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References

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  1. Paul Glewwe & Nauman Ilias & Michael Kremer, 2010. "Teacher Incentives," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 205-27, July.
  2. Angrist, Joshua & Guryan, Jonathan, 2005. "Does Teacher Testing Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence from State Certification Requirements," IZA Discussion Papers 1500, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Edward P. Lazear, 2004. "Speeding, Tax Fraud, and Teaching to the Test," NBER Working Papers 10932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
  5. Richard Blundell & Monica Costa Dias, 2000. "Evaluation methods for non-experimental data," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(4), pages 427-468, January.
  6. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2004. "International Differences in Student Achievement: An Economic Perspective," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(3), pages 357-380, 08.
  7. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Felix Büchel, 2005. "The Effect Of Central Exit Examinations On Student Achievement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From TIMSS Germany," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(5), pages 1134-1155, 09.
  8. Bishop, J., 1997. "The Effect of national Standards and Curriculum-Based Exams on Achievement," Papers 97-01, Cornell - Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.
  9. Effinger, M.R. & Polborn, M.K., 1997. "A Model of Vertically Differenciated Education," Papers 97.469, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  10. Heckman, James J & Ichimura, Hidehiko & Todd, Petra, 1998. "Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 261-94, April.
  11. Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, 1999. "Do Higher Salaries Buy Better Teachers?," NBER Working Papers 7082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Bishop, John H, 1997. "The Effect of National Standards and Curriculum-Based Exams on Achievement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 260-64, May.
  13. Wößmann, Ludger, 2002. "Central Exams Improve Educational Performance: International Evidence," Kiel Discussion Papers 397, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  14. Victor Lavy, 2002. "Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1286-1317, December.
  15. Victor Lavy, 2004. "Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics," NBER Working Papers 10622, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Woessmann, Ludger, 2007. "Fundamental Determinants of School Efficiency and Equity: German States as a Microcosm for OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 2880, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Benedikt Langner & Jochen Siller, 2008. "Institutionelle Anreizfaktoren im deutschen Schulsystem: Status quo und Reformoptionen am Beispiel Nordrhein-Westfalens," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2008, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
  3. Robert Schwager, 2005. "PISA-Schock und Hochschulmisere - Hat der deutsche Bildungsföderalismus versagt?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(2), pages 189-205, 05.
  4. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2007. "Fair ranking of teachers," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 411-431, May.
  5. Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Grade inflation, social background, and labour market matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 56-66.
  6. Ludger Woessmann, 2010. "Institutional Determinants of School Efficiency and Equity: German States as a Microcosm for OECD Countries," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 230(2), pages 234-270.
  7. Kerstin Schneider & Hendrik Jürges, 2008. "Central exit examinations increase performance... but take the fun out of mathematics," Schumpeter Discussion Papers sdp08001, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.
  8. Piopiunik, Marc & Schwerdt, Guido & Wößmann, Ludger, 2013. "Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes," Munich Reprints in Economics 19325, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Jaag, Christian, 2006. "Teacher Incentives," MPRA Paper 340, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Ludger Wößmann, 2005. "Leistungsfördernde Anreize für das Schulsystem," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 58(19), pages 18-27, October.
  11. Michael Fertig, 2004. "What Can We Learn From International Student Performance Studies? Some Methodological Remarks," RWI Discussion Papers 0023, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
  12. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Hideo Kozumi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2009. "Does yardstick regulation really work? Empirical evidence from Japan’s rail industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 308-323, December.
  13. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Martin Senkbeil & Claus H. Carstensen, 2009. "Assessment Drives Learning: The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular Knowledge and Mathematical Literacy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2666, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Ludger Wö�mann, 2006. "Bildungspolitische Lehren aus den internationalen Schülertests: Wettbewerb, Autonomie und externe Leistungsüberprüfung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(3), pages 417-444, 08.
  15. Himmler, Oliver & Schwager, Robert, 2007. "Double Standards in Educational Standards: Are Disadvantaged Students Being Graded More Leniently?," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-016, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

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