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Teacher Quality and Incentives: Theoretical and Empirical Effects of Standards on Teacher Quality

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Author Info
Hendrik Jürges ()
Wolfram Richter ()
Kerstin Schneider ()

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Abstract

Applying the theory of yardstick competition to the schooling system, we show that it is optimal to have central tests of student achievement and to engage in benchmarking because it raises the quality of teaching. This is true even if teachers’ pay (defined in monetary terms) is not performance related. If teachers value reputation, and if teaching output is measured so that it becomes comparable, teachers will increase their effort. The theory is tested using the German PISA-E data. Our estimates suggest that, despite the flat career profile of German teachers, the quality of teaching tends to be higher in federal states with central exams.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1296.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1296

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Related research
Keywords: education; teacher quality; central examinations; yardstick competition; matching;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Felix Büchel, 2005. "The Effect Of Central Exit Examinations On Student Achievement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From TIMSS Germany," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(5), pages 1134-1155, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, 2001. "Why Public Schools Lose Teachers," NBER Working Papers 8599, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Victor Lavy, 2002. "Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1286-1317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Paul Glewwe & Nauman Ilias & Michael Kremer, 2003. "Teacher Incentives," NBER Working Papers 9671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Victor Lavy, 2004. "Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics," NBER Working Papers 10622, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Joshua D. Angrist & Jonathan Guryan, 2003. "Does Teacher Testing Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence from State Certification Requirements," NBER Working Papers 9545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Richard Blundell & Monica Costa Dias, 2000. "Evaluation methods for non-experimental data," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(4), pages 427-468, January. [Downloadable!]
  8. Robert Mislevy, 1991. "Randomization-based inference about latent variables from complex samples," Psychometrika, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 177-196, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Heckman, James J & Ichimura, Hidehiko & Todd, Petra, 1998. "Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(2), pages 261-94, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Effinger, M.R. & Polborn, M.K., 1997. "A Model of Vertically Differenciated Education," Papers 97.469, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
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  11. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2004. "International Differences in Student Achievement: An Economic Perspective," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(3), pages 357-380, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, 1999. "Do Higher Salaries Buy Better Teachers?," NBER Working Papers 7082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bishop, J., 1997. "The Effect of national Standards and Curriculum-Based Exams on Achievement," Papers 97-01, Cornell - Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.
  14. Bishop, John H, 1997. "The Effect of National Standards and Curriculum-Based Exams on Achievement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 260-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, January.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ludger Wößmann, 2007. "Fundamental Determinants of School Efficiency and Equity: German States as a Microcosm for OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 2880, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2007. "Fair ranking of teachers," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 411-431, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider & Martin Senkbeil & Claus H. Carstensen, 2009. "Assessment Drives Learning: The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular Knowledge and Mathematical Literacy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Himmler, Oliver & Schwager, Robert, 2007. "Double Standards in Educational Standards ? Are Disadvantaged Students Being Graded More Leniently?," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-016, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Michael Fertig, 2004. "What Can We Learn From International Student Performance Studies? Some Methodological Remarks," RWI Discussion Papers 0023, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jaag, Christian, 2006. "Teacher Incentives," MPRA Paper 340, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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