Social Contracts, Markets And Efficiency -- Groundwater Irrigation In North India
AbstractThis paper uses primary data to analyze the institutions and informal markets that govern groundwater allocation in the principal sugarcane belt of North India. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the observed water trades result in efficient water allocation across farms. We interpret this and other stylized facts in terms of a simple bargaining model with limited inter-player transfers. Poor functioning of the power sector leads to reduced pumping and a water supply constraint. Simulations show that power supply reform can significantly increase farm yields, be financed out of the increased farm profits, and provide an instrument to use for attaining intertemporal efficiency in water allocation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number 183.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Banerji, A. & Meenakshi, J.V. & Khanna, Gauri, 2012. "Social contracts, markets and efficiency: Groundwater irrigation in North India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 228-237.
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-05-02 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2010-05-02 (Central & Western Asia)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
- Srivastava, S.K. & Kumar, Ranjit & Singh, R.P., 2009. "Extent of Groundwater Extraction and Irrigation Efficiency on Farms under Different Water-market Regimes in Central Uttar Pradesh," Agricultural Economics Research Review, Agricultural Economics Research Association (India), vol. 22(1).
- Mukherji, Aditi, 2007. "The energy-irrigation nexus and its impact on groundwater markets in eastern Indo-Gangetic basin: Evidence from West Bengal, India," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6413-6430, December.
- Olley, G Steven & Pakes, Ariel, 1996. "The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1263-97, November.
- James Levinsohn & Amil Petrin, 2003. "Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 317-341.
- James Levinsohn & Amil Petrin, 2000.
"Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables,"
NBER Working Papers
7819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James Levinsohn & Amil Petrin, 2003. "Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 317-341, 04.
- Siwan Anderson, 2011. "Caste as an Impediment to Trade," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 239-63, January.
- Jacoby, Hanan G. & Murgai, Rinku & Rehman, Saeed Ur, 2001.
"Monopoly power and distribution in fragmented markets : the case of groundwater,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2628, The World Bank.
- Hanan G. Jacoby & Rinku Murgai & Saeed Ur Rehman, 2004. "Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 783-808.
- Hanan G. Jacoby & Rinku Murgai & Saeed Rehman, 2004. "Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 783-808, 07.
- Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
- Aggarwal, Rimjhim M., 2007. "Role of risk sharing and transaction costs in contract choice: Theory and evidence from groundwater contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 475-496, July.
- Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela, 1996. "Groundwater markets in Pakistan: participation and productivity," Research reports 105, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Evenson, Robert E. & Pray, Carl E. & Rosegrant, Mark W., 1999. "Agricultural research and productivity growth in India:," Research reports 109, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Schoengold, Karina & Zilberman, David, 2007. "The Economics of Water, Irrigation, and Development," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Elsevier.
- Watto, Muhammad, 2013. "Measuring Groundwater Irrigation Efficiency in Pakistan: A DEA Approach Using the Sub-vector and Slack-based Models," 2013 Conference (57th), February 5-8, 2013, Sydney, Australia 152204, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Watto, Muhammad Arif & Mugera, Amin William, 2013. "Measuring Groundwater Irrigation Efficiency in Pakistan: A DEA Approach Using the Sub-vector and Slack-based Models," Working Papers 144943, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Michler, Jeffrey D. & Wu, Steven, 2013. "Contracting for Groundwater Irrigation:A Principal-Agent Based Approach to Determining Contract Effectiveness," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149437, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Michler, Je ffrey D. & Balagtas, Joseph V., 2013. "The Determinants of Rice Storage: Evidence from Rice Farmers in Bangladesh," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150267, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vinayan. K.P).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.