Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater
AbstractThis paper examines monopoly power in the market for groundwater (irrigation water extracted by private tubewells), a market characterized by barriers to entry and spatial fragmentation. In Pakistan's Punjab region, groundwater and tenancy contracts are often interlinked, with share-tenants gaining access to water through the use of their landlord's tubewell. An analysis of groundwater transactions shows that tenants of tubewell owners are charged lower prices than other customers. Tubewell owners and their tenants also use considerably more groundwater on their plots than other farmers. Using detailed price and quantity data, the efficiency and distributional implications of this monopoly power are explored. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Hanan G. Jacoby & Rinku Murgai & Saeed Rehman, 2004. "Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 783-808, 07.
- Jacoby, Hanan G. & Murgai, Rinku & Rehman, Saeed Ur, 2001. "Monopoly power and distribution in fragmented markets : the case of groundwater," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2628, The World Bank.
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