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Information, Reputation and Ethnic Conflict Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Rohner, D.
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Empirical studies have found ethnic cleavages to play an important role in the occurrence of civil conflict. Surprisingly, theoretical research on ethnic con.ict has been very scarce. In the present contribution a theoretical model of reputation and ethnic conflict is built. Depending on the information structure and the reputation cost of defecting, economic interaction can either result in (peaceful) trade or in appropriative conflict. Ethnic divisions affect the reputation cost of defection and therefore influence the conflict risk. It is shown what respective effects ethnic fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation have on the risk of conflict.
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number
0658.
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Length: 29
Date of creation: Nov 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0658Note: EcContact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Howard Cobb).
Keywords: Conflict ; Ethnicity ; Reputation ; Information ; Trade ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology
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UFAE and IAE Working Papers
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