This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Avinash Dixit

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Consider a world of traders separated in geographic, economic, or social space. Honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders, but frequencies of meetings, and information flows about cheating, have local bias. Honesty is self-enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors. Global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world. The extent of self-enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size. Costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large, and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self-governing small community. Intermediate-size worlds fare worst.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JPE111604PDF
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: A link to the University of Chicago Press online edition may require you to be a subscriber to this journal to access the full text, unless the article is not yet subject to access control.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 111 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1293-1317
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:111:y:2003:i:6:p:1293-1317

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/home.html

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Attila Ambrus & Markus Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2007. "Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks," Economics Working Papers 0079, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles, 2009. "International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Steffen Lippert & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2004. "Networks of Relations," Discussion Papers 28, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ruys, P.H.M., 2005. "The governance of services," Discussion Paper 24, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
  5. Paolo Buonanno & Giacomo Pasini & Paolo Vanin, 2008. "Crime and Social Sanction," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0071, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
  6. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Subramanian, Arjunan & Qaim, Matin, 2006. "Competition, Kinship or Reciprocity? Village Experiments in Alternative Modes of Exchange," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25434, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ruys, Pieter H.M., 2005. "The governance of services," Discussion Paper 102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2009. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Institutions," ICER Working Papers 14-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Matthieu Chemin, 2007. "Does Judicial Quality Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Judicial Reform in India," Cahiers de recherche 0725, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  11. Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 2008. "Opportunistic Discrimination," Working Papers 2008-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  12. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Munetomo Ando & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2004. "Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-276, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  14. Dominic Rohner, 2008. "Reputation, Group Structure and Social Tensions," HiCN Working Papers 40, Households in Conflict Network. [Downloadable!]
  15. Harbord, David, 2006. "Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited," MPRA Paper 1889, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Luca Anderlini & Daniele Terlizzese, 2009. "Equilibrium Trust," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000379, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  17. Fali Huang, 2006. "The Transition from Relational to Legal Contract Enforcement," Working Papers 23-2006, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Peter Leeson, 2007. "Efficient anarchy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 41-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles, 2009. "International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity," Working Papers 2009-08, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Rohner, D., 2006. "Information, Reputation and Ethnic Conflict," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0658, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  21. Matthieu Chemin, 2007. "The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity," Cahiers de recherche 0724, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was sponsored from 1997 to 2002 by the Université du Québec à Montréal.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.