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Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector

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  • DE BORGER, Bruno
  • PROOST, Stef

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with horizontal and vertical tax competition in the transport sector, taking into account the role of transport externalities. Our emphasis throughout is on tax competition between welfare maximizing governments. For the various different settings (horizontal and vertical competition, parallel and serial networks), we discuss the relevance of tax competition and describe the type of results obtained in the scarce literature on the topic. We further point out the relevance of different types of tax competition for transport policy in a European setting. Finally, we discuss the losses of noncooperative behaviour of governments.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004022.

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Length: 27 pages
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Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2004022

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Postal: Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerpen
Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
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References

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  1. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
  2. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March.
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  5. DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef & VAN DENDER, K., . "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," Working Papers 2004003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  6. Braid, Ralph M., 1996. "Peak-Load Pricing of a Transportation Route with an Unpriced Substitute," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 179-197, September.
  7. DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef, . "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Working Papers 2004022, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  8. Haufler, Andreas, 1996. "Optimal Factor and Commodity Taxation in a Small Open Economy," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 20393, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. De Borger Bruno & Stef Proost, 2004. "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment ete0412, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  2. Andre de Palma & Lindsey Robin & Proost Stef, 2005. "Research challenges in modelling urban road pricing: an overview," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment ete0506, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  3. Gühnemann, Astrid & Koh, Andrew & Shepherd, Simon & Lawler, Mary, 2011. "Implications of interdependencies between charging strategies of local authorities for the protection of sensitive areas in the Trans-Pennine Corridor," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 42-52, January.
  4. Toon Vandyck & Stef Proost, 2011. "Regional government competition and incentives for commuting taxes and transport investments," ERSA conference papers ersa11p892, European Regional Science Association.
  5. Barry Ubbels & Erik Verhoef, 2006. "Governmental Competition in Road Charging and Capacity Choice," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 06-036/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 10 Sep 2007.
  6. Sen, Akshaya Kumar & Tiwari, Geetam & Upadhyay, Vrajaindra, 2013. "Strategies of state and local government in management of urban transport problems – A case of Delhi," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 11-21.
  7. Proost, Stef & Sen, Ahksaya, 2006. "Urban transport pricing reform with two levels of government: A case study of Brussels," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 127-139, March.

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