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Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector

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  • DE BORGER, Bruno
  • PROOST, Stef

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with horizontal and vertical tax competition in the transport sector, taking into account the role of transport externalities. Our emphasis throughout is on tax competition between welfare maximizing governments. For the various different settings (horizontal and vertical competition, parallel and serial networks), we discuss the relevance of tax competition and describe the type of results obtained in the scarce literature on the topic. We further point out the relevance of different types of tax competition for transport policy in a European setting. Finally, we discuss the losses of noncooperative behaviour of governments.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004022.

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Length: 27 pages
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Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2004022

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Toon VANDYCK & Stef PROOST, 2011. "Inefficiencies in regional commuting policy," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces11.18, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  2. Palma, André de & Lindsey, Robin & Proost, Stef, 2006. "Research challenges in modelling urban road pricing: An overview," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 97-105, March.
  3. DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef, . "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Working Papers 2004022, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  4. Gühnemann, Astrid & Koh, Andrew & Shepherd, Simon & Lawler, Mary, 2011. "Implications of interdependencies between charging strategies of local authorities for the protection of sensitive areas in the Trans-Pennine Corridor," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 42-52, January.
  5. Proost, Stef & Sen, Ahksaya, 2006. "Urban transport pricing reform with two levels of government: A case study of Brussels," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 127-139, March.
  6. Barry Ubbels & Erik Verhoef, 2006. "Governmental Competition in Road Charging and Capacity Choice," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-036/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 10 Sep 2007.
  7. Sen, Akshaya Kumar & Tiwari, Geetam & Upadhyay, Vrajaindra, 2013. "Strategies of state and local government in management of urban transport problems – A case of Delhi," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 11-21.

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