Inefficiencies in regional commuting policy
AbstractThis paper discusses investments in transport infrastructure and incentives for commuting taxes in a multiregional setting. We study the horizontal and vertical interactions between governments. We identify incentives for strategic and tax exporting behavior that might lead to underinvestment in transport infrastructure. Furthermore, we show that the intensity of the strategic behavior is affected by geographic firm ownership structure, the number of labor-supplying regions and the revenue-sharing mechanism in the federation. A numerical example applies the insights on commuting in Belgium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën in its series Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers with number ces11.18.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2012-04-03 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-URE-2012-04-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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