Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Commuting subsidies with two transport modes

Contents:

Author Info

  • Borck, Rainald
  • Wrede, Matthias

Abstract

We study a simple model of commuting subsidies with two transport modes. City residents choose where to live and which mode to use. When all land is owned by city residents, one group gains from subsidies what the other loses. With absentee landownership, city residents as a group gain at the expense of landowners. Subsidies toward different modes have different effects, however. For instance, in one case, rich automobile drivers suffer from transit subsidies, while poor transit users may benefit from subsidies to automobiles.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WMG-4PDSBJ4-5/2/1c07564393a3bb9aa51f87238d2fd9fa
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.

Volume (Year): 63 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 841-848

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:63:y:2008:i:3:p:841-848

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905

Related research

Keywords: Commuting subsidies Voting; monocentric city;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Brueckner, Jan K. & Selod, Harris, 2006. "The political economy of urban transport-system choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 983-1005, August.
  2. Jan K. Brueckner, 2003. "Transport Subsidies, System Choice, and Urban Sprawl," CESifo Working Paper Series 1090, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1981. "Aggregate Land Rents and Aggregate Transport Costs," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(362), pages 331-47, June.
  4. Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn & Jordan Rappaport, 2000. "Why Do the Poor Live in Cities?," NBER Working Papers 7636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Rainald Borck & Matthias Wrede, 2004. "Political Economy of Commuting Subsidies," CESifo Working Paper Series 1339, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. LeRoy, Stephen F. & Sonstelie, Jon, 1983. "Paradise lost and regained: Transportation innovation, income, and residential location," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 67-89, January.
  7. Sasaki, Komei, 1990. "Income class, modal choice, and urban spatial structure," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 322-343, May.
  8. Charles A. M. de Bartolome & Stephen L. Ross, 2002. "Who's in Charge in the Inner City? The Conflict Between Efficiency and Equity in the Design of a Metropolitan Area," Working papers 2002-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  9. de Bartolome, Charles A. M. & Ross, Stephen L., 2004. "Who's in charge of the central city? The conflict between efficiency and equity in the design of a metropolitan area," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 458-483, November.
  10. DeSalvo, Joseph S. & Huq, Mobinul, 1996. "Income, Residential Location, and Mode Choice," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 84-99, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Toon VANDYCK & Stef PROOST, 2011. "Inefficiencies in regional commuting policy," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces11.18, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  2. J. Atsu Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," Working Papers 0702, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
  3. Toon Vandyck & Stef Proost, 2011. "Regional government competition and incentives for commuting taxes and transport investments," ERSA conference papers ersa11p892, European Regional Science Association.
  4. Parry, Ian W.H. & Timilsina, Govinda R., 2010. "How should passenger travel in Mexico City be priced?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 167-182, September.
  5. Borck, Rainald & Wrede, Matthias, 2009. "Subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 25-32, July.
  6. Felix Creutzig, 2012. "Avoiding Carbon Lock-In: Policy Options for Advancing Structural Change," Working Papers 1, Department of Climate Change Economics, TU Berlin, revised Feb 2012.
  7. Eva Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau & Jos van Ommeren, 2009. "Labour Supply and Commuting," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 222, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
  8. Georg Hirte & Stefan Tscharaktschiew, 2011. "Income tax deduction of commuting expenses and tax funding in an urban CGE study: the case of German cities," ERSA conference papers ersa11p274, European Regional Science Association.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:63:y:2008:i:3:p:841-848

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.