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Why States Toll: An Empirical Model of Finance Choice

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  • David Levinson

Abstract

This paper examines the question of why some states impose tolls while others rely more heavily on fuel and other taxes. A model to predict the share of street and highway revenue from tolls is estimated as a function of the share of non-resident workers, the policies of neighbouring states, historical factors, and population. The more non-resident workers, the greater the likelihood of tolling, after controlling for the miles of toll road planned or constructed before the 1956 Interstate Act. Similarly if a state exports a number of residents to work out-of-state and those neighbouring states toll, it will be likely to retaliate by imposing its own tolls. Decentralisation of finance and control of the road network from the federal to the state, metropolitan, and city and county levels of government will increase the incentives for the highway-managing jurisdiction to impose tolls. ? The London School of Economics and the University of Bath 2001

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  • David Levinson, 2001. "Why States Toll: An Empirical Model of Finance Choice," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 35(2), pages 223-237, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:35:y:2001:i:2:p:223-237
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    Cited by:

    1. De Borger, B. & Dunkerley, F. & Proost, S., 2007. "Strategic investment and pricing decisions in a congested transport corridor," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 294-316, September.
    2. Bruno de Borger & Stef Proost, 2004. "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 45-64.
    3. De Borger, B. & Proost, S. & Van Dender, K., 2005. "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2013-2040, November.
    4. Bruno De Borger & Wilfried Pauwels, 2010. "A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls and investment in serial transport corridors," Working Papers 2010/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    5. Westin, Jonas & Franklin, Joel P. & Proost, Stef & Basck, Pierre & Raux, Charles, 2016. "Achieving political acceptability for new transport infrastructure in congested urban regions," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 286-303.
    6. David Levinson & Andrew Odlyzko, 2007. "Too Expensive to Meter: The influence of transaction costs in transportation and communication," Working Papers 200802, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group, revised Feb 2007.
    7. De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2012. "Transport policy competition between governments: A selective survey of the literature," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 35-48.
    8. Pierre Basck & Charles Raux & Jonas Westin & Joel P. Franklin & Stef Proost, 2012. "CoAccept. Coordination politique et acceptabilité des péages routiers. Rapport final," Working Papers halshs-01707861, HAL.
    9. De Borger, Bruno & Dunkerley, Fay & Proost, Stef, 2009. "Capacity cost structure, welfare and cost recovery: Are transport infrastructures with high fixed costs a handicap?," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 506-521, June.
    10. Vickerman, Roger, 2008. "Provision of public transport under conflicting regulatory regimes," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1176-1182, November.
    11. Watling, D.P. & Shepherd, S.P. & Koh, A., 2015. "Cordon toll competition in a network of two cities: Formulation and sensitivity to traveller route and demand responses," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 93-116.
    12. Bruno De Borger & Wilfried Pauwels, 2010. "A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls and investment in serial transport corridors," Working Papers 2010/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    13. Grahn-Voorneveld, Sofia, 2011. "Sharing profit in parallel and serial transport networks," Working papers in Transport Economics 2011:7, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    14. Gühnemann, Astrid & Koh, Andrew & Shepherd, Simon & Lawler, Mary, 2011. "Implications of interdependencies between charging strategies of local authorities for the protection of sensitive areas in the Trans-Pennine Corridor," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 42-52, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R40 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - General
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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